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CIRCUMVENTING INSIDER TRADING LAWS BY
CYBERHACKING: A LOOK INTO THE VULNERABILITY OF
CYBERSECURITY BREACHES IN REGARD TO INSIDER
TRADING
by Sonal Sahel
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2014, there was a large online security breach known as the 'heartbleed
bug,' which compromised private and confidential information for many large and wellknown companies. 1 There have been news reports in which experts state that these breaches
go beyond the surface of people's passwords, social security numbers and other confidential
information being leaked. 2 These experts state that illegal insider trading may have occurred
since many public companies that were affected by the security bug saw a drop in their stocks
prior to the release of unwelcoming news, such as letting the public know that their systems
had been hacked. 3 The evidence of stock prices falling prior to the public release of the
negative news, may indicate that the security breach led to the release of private and
confidential information, which in turn led to investors selling their stocks before the news
release and its immediate stock price drop. 4 In today's society, information travels rapidly due
to the advanced technology we are now accustomed to, which accentuates the stock market's
fluctuations. 5
Technology has changed many aspects of business that were traditionally kept in
paper format into a digital form, including secured databases on the Internet. Companies are
keeping information about their clients, such as passwords, social security numbers and other
private data online. On the other hand, consumers are willingly giving the information to
companies online, with the understanding that it is through a secured network. 6 In addition,
companies keep various internal documents online due to the ease of organization and ability
to work efficiently in our modem and global society. 7 Examples of these internal documents
include financial data, stock information, private timelines for releasing information
publically, etc. 8

1 Ryan Sherwin, Heartbleed bug may have caused insider trading, says web security expert, THE
30, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/heartbleed-bugmay-have-caused-insider-trading-says-web-security-expert-9307848.htrnl.
2 Gerry Smith, Your Favorite Websites CouldHave Warned You About Heartbleed,But Didn't, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/17/websites-heartbleed_n_5161298.html.
' Sherwin, supra note 1.
41d.
Tamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1319, 1334
(1998).
6 Lauren C. Williams, The Heartbleed Bug Reveals We're Willing To Give Up Online Security To Feel More
Connected, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2014/04/11/3425310/what-theheartbleed-bug-says-about-our-interconnectivity.
7 id.
INDEPENDENT (Apr.

8 FTC, COPIER DATA SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESSES (Nov. 2010).
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The fear of insider trading resulting from the heartbleed bug forces us to turn to the
regulations to determine if such transactions are illegal and chargeable. The Securities
Exchange Act was enacted in 1934, 9 a time when the technology and wealth of information
that we have today was unimaginable. Due to the various enhancements that the Internet and
other technology bring, many companies keep a great deal of information online.' 0 There are
great advantages of utilizing the Internet's ability, such as having nearly immediate access
from all comers of the world and sharing information with specific parties easily. Staying
organized in an efficient and cost effective manner are further benefits of the Internet,
compared to boxes and cabinets of files. The unfortunate consequence of online storage is that
it leaves this information vulnerable to getting into the wrong hands via security
breaches/hackers.
Companies and consumers have been using technology in this manner for decades
and it has gained a place in society with the assumption that this information is private and
secured. 1 Recent security breaches through Internet bugs such as the April 2014 'heartbleed'
bug and the September 2014 'shellshock' bug, 12 have brought a quick and a delayed
realization that not all information is secure. 13 These Internet bugs are infiltrating the database
and servers of various public companies, leading to privacy and identification violations.
Information such as names, social security numbers and addresses may be getting in the
wrong hands, creating the possibility of insider trading transactions. 4
Despite society's dependency on the Internet, there are currently no cybersecurity
requirements placed on private companies. 5 The lack of cybersecurity requirements poses a
number of dangers, potentially including insider trading transactions. 16 Society's current
failure to enact cybersecurity standards makes hackers capable of obtaining private
information that they are not privy too.' 7 Furthermore, the information that hackers have the
ability to obtain can be circulated to others who cannot be subject to insider trading actions
due to the current interpretation of the laws. 18
Intemet security breaches are unique in that they are extremely to track and
therefore often get away with crimes and leave havoc in their path. 19 Security breaches have
presented a great number of issues; such as identify theft, email and other communication

9 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
1o Through various 'online' platforms, such as clouds, emails, servers, etc.
11 Consumers of All Ages More Concerned About Online Data Privacy, EMARKETER (May 6, 2014),
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Consumers-of-All-Ages-More-Concerned-About-Online-DataPrivacy/] 010815#sthash.zlwBs6GC.dpuf.
12 David Gilbert, Shellshock: What Cyber Security Experts Have to Say About Bash Bug, lB
TIMEs (Sept. 26,
2014), https://uk.news.yahoo.com/shellshock-cyber-security-experts-bash-bug-l 01828223.html#wRqZsVv.
13 Sam Frizell, Report: DevastatingHeartbleedFlaw Was Used in HospitalHack, TIME MAG. (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://time.com/3148773/report-devastating-heartbleed-flaw-was-used-in-hospital-hack.
14 Sherwin, supra note
1.
15 ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY:
OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 1-2 (2013).
16

Sherwin, supra note 1.

17 Id.
1" SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
19

Elizabeth Orton & Chris Schlag, Creating a Model of Cyber Proficiency: Remodeling Law Enforcement

Tactics in Pittsburgh to Address the Evolving Nature of Cybersecurity, 14 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 276, 278
(Spring 2014).
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privacy violations, and the virtual impersonation of others . 20 This Note will deal exclusively
with the insider trading issue that Internet security breaches have presented. 21
As companies have a great desire to keep information online, laws to protect this
information are also necessary. There is a serious concern regarding the ability of
cyberhackers2 2 to steal corporate information and evade insider trading regulations. Since a
cyberhacker is not a corporate insider, 3 they have no fiduciary duty to the company and
therefore cannot satisfy the elements of insider trading and neither can those who they pass
the hacked information to, known as tippees.24
Part II of this Note will present the current securities laws regarding insider trading,
how they are being interpreted and applied, and why they no longer protect all aspects of
potential insider trading. Part III analyzes how the current laws are being circumvented and
Part IV identifies how both the insider trading regulations need to be amended to account for
hackers and that cybersecurity regulations must be implemented.
II. CURRENT INSIDER TRADING MATTERS
Today's Insider Trading Laws
The Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") states that it prohibits insider trading
"[b]ecause insider trading undermines investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
securities markets." 25 Enforcing the insider trading regulations aims to ensure that people are
not wrongfully profiting off of companies, due to their position of having private and
confidential material information, 26 prior to the general public and relying on that information
for their personal gain.27 Insider trading is a large issue evidenced by studies stating that
insiders make $5 billion dollars each year due to trading on private information.28 Securities
fraud is a sizeable concern for public companies, and those who are profiting can only be

The Heartbleed Bug, CODENOMICON, http://heartbleed.com (last updated Apr. 29,2014).
Chris Green, Shellshock superbug: Can anything stop the hackers? Millions of users' online details at risk,
THE
INDEPENDENT
(Sept.
26,
2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-andtech/news/shellshock-criminals-may-already-be-exploiting-biggest-ever-computer-bug-9758146.html.
22 The definition of cyberhack comes from the combination of cyber and hack. Cyber is defined as "of, relating
to, or involving computers or computer networks (as the Internet)." Cyber - definition, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, bttp://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cyber (last visited Feb 1., 2015).
Hack is defined as "to gain access to a computer illegally." Hack - definition, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hack (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
23 Corporate insiders are defined as officers, directors, and 10% shareholders. (Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 209, n. 28 (1976).
24 Tippees are defined as those who receive material nonpublic information from tippers and can be
liable for
trading on the information. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983).
23 insider Trading,SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
26 Material information is defined by the Supreme Court as information in which 'there is a substantial
20
21

likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to [trade]." TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,439 (1976).

27 Insider Trading,supra note 25.
28 Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of CorporateInsider Trading Through PreTradingDisclosure, 71
S. CAL. L. REv. 303, 306 (1998).
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found guilty if there is the intent to defraud through manipulation or deception.29 Security
breaches on the Internet may allow hackers to steal material nonpublic information and pass it
on to others.
A tipper is the one that owes a fiduciary duty to the company and breaches their3
duty by passing material nonpublic information on to a tippee with the requisite scienter. 0
Scienter is the intent to commit fraud or reckless disregard for the truth, which goes beyond
mere negligence.31 Scienter on the part of the tipper means deliberately or recklessly passing
on confidential information to a tippee when the tippee is aware that the tipper is breaching
their fiduciary duty. 32
Tippees are those who receive material nonpublic information from tippers and can
be liable for trading on the information. 33 The requisite scienter of the tippee is when the
tippee knows that the information that they have received is material nonpublic information,
and the tippee knows or should know that the information would be in breach of the tipper's
fiduciary duty. 34
Fiduciary duty is the duty owed by those who have access to nonpublic information,
to act in the best interest of the company. 3' A fiduciary duty further requires those who hold
material nonpublic information to abstain from relying on the information or to disclose the
information publically. 36 Per case precedent, 3' a tippee can be charged with 38
insider trading if
it can be shown that the identifiable tipper has breaching their fiduciary duty.
The illegality of insider trader is found in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.39 Section 10(b) prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"
in connection with "the purchase or sale of any security."4 ° In 1934, Congress created the
SEC to enforce the Securities Exchange Act. 41 Through the powers given to the SEC to
regulate the securities markets, the SEC codified insider trading rules as rule lOb-5.42
Rule lOb-5 forbids any person "[t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud" and "[t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" on the securities markets. 43 Rule lOb-5-1 holds that "the purchase or sale of a
security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information ... in breach of a duty of
29 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663, n. 23 (1983); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).

3o Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663, n. 23.
31 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, n.12 (1976); SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir.
1998).
32 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-62.
33 Id. at 660.
34 Id.

35 Hagar Cohen, Cracking Hacking: ExpandingInsider TradingLiability in the DigitalAge, 17 SW. J. INT'L L.
259, 274 (2011).
36 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 647.
" See id.
38 Id.
31 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
4 Id.
41 The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#create (last modified June 13, 2013).
42 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
43 § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2012).
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trust or confidence that is owed ...to the [company] ...or to any other person who is the
source of the material nonpublic information." Furthermore, rule lOb-5-2 prohibits "the
material nonpublic
purchase or sale of securities on the basis of, or the communication of,
45
information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.,
Insider trading is an activity that the SEC would greatly like to avoid, and thus the
Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation FD") requirement was adopted in October of 2000 to
46
further deter and identify potential insider trading action. Regulation FD requires all public
companies to file a Form 8-K and disclose material nonpublic information, thus making it
47
public, when an insider discloses material nonpublic information to enumerated persons.
This regulation was passed to preclude selective disclosure by public companies and allow
48
everyone to gain access to the same information at the same time.
Intentional selective disclosure requires the company to file the Form 8-K
simultaneously with the selective disclosure, thus ensuring that those in the selective
disclosure group are unable to trade on the newly public information prior to the information
49
circulating and having the ability to profit like insider trading offenders. For unintentional
selective disclosure, the public disclosure must be made promptly. 50Regulation FD was
implemented to encompass those who evaded Rule 10b-5 violations by stating that the
information was public at the time that they relied and traded on the information. In reality,
these evaders happened to gain information before it had a chance to circulate through
publically, thus allowing sufficient time to conduct trades prior to the markets accounting for
5
and adjusting to the newly publicized information. ' Therefore, such traders were profiting
52
from the markets by an arrangement similar to insider trading transactions.
Insider trading is broken up into two theories: the classical theory and the
misappropriation theory. 3 Under the classical theory, those considered insiders are liable to
the company as they have a fiduciary duty to the company; those insiders have been defined
as officers, directors and 10% shareholders. 5 4 Secondly, the misappropriation theory broadly
on material nonpublic information in breach
applies when securities are traded with reliance
55
of the fiduciary duty owed to the company.
5 6
Under the misappropriation theory, the seminal case is SEC v. O'Hagan 0 'Hagan
demonstrates how insider trading actions have expanded beyond the classical theory.
O'Hagan, an attorney of a law firm, was guilty of insider trading by relying and trading on

44 § 240.1 0b5-1. SEC codifies that awareness is enough. Id.
41 § 240.1 0b5-2. SEC ensures that they are able to count family members as tippees. Id.

Disclosure and Insider Trading, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 243, 249 (2000) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/finalU33-7881 .htm (Aug. 15, 2000).
46 Selective
47 Id.
48 id.
49 Id.

soId.
51 id.
52 id.
53 Allan Horwich, The Origin, Application, Validity, and PotentialMisuse of Rule 10b5-1, 62 THE Bus. LAW.,
914, 916 (May 2007).
54Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., Release No. 6668, Release No. 34-6668, 40 SEC 907, 3 (Nov. 8, 1961).
55United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
56 O'Hagan,521 U.S.
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material nonpublic information of the law firm's client, a public company. 57 The Court found
that O'Hagan violated section 10(b) as the deceptive device used for the purchase of stock
was the reliance of material nonpublic information obtained through his position. 58 The
defendant obtained the material nonpublic information in confidence, which also gave rise to
a fiduciary duty to the company. 59 O'Hagan was convicted of insider trading, despite not
being 1an insider, 60 thus also establishing that an outsider can be a tippee within the 'Dirks

test.'

6

The Dirks test was established by Dirks v. SEC 62 and is used to determine if a tippee
is liable for insider trading. Dirks expanded insider trading regulations by finding that the
misappropriation theory can extend to third parties (tippees). 63 The Dirks test is satisfied
when a tipper breaches their fiduciary duty to the company by passing material nonpublic
information to the tippee, along with their fiduciary duty to abstain or disclose to a tippee. 64 A
tipper has breached their fiduciary duty to the company if they passed the material nonpublic
information on with scienter and in exchange of a personal benefit. 65
Under the Dirks test, it should be noted that a tippee can pass the information on to
another tippee, known as a remote tippee and continue the chain of liability. 66 Remote tippees
are liable if they trade on information that they know, or have reason to know, derives from a
breach of fiduciary duty.67 Remote tippees have also been liable when they stated that they
did not want to know the source of the information. 68 Further, the first tippee must pass the
information on intentionally or recklessly to the remote tippee(s) for their own benefit and
have or should69 have knowledge that the information was obtained through a breach of
fiduciary duty.
Given the elements of insider trading liability, a tippee is only liable if they know or
have reason to know that the tipper is breaching their fiduciary duty, as the tippee's duty is
derived from the tipper's duty.7" In December 2014, the Second Circuit recently added to the
SEC's burden, by finding that a tippee is only liable under insider trading laws if they had
actual knowledge that the tipper gained a personal benefit and breached their fiduciary duty
which was passed onto the tippee.Tl

I at 659.
Id.
Id. at 643.
59 id.
60

Id. at 666.

61

Id.; see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-58 (1983).

62 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
63

See Donald C. Langevoort, "FineDistinctions" in the ContemporaryLaw of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM.

Bus. L. REv. 429,451 (2013).
64 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980).
65 463 U.S. 646, 647, 663 (1983).
66 United State v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 227 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 13536 (2d Cir. 2001); SEC v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
649-50 (1983).
67 See SEC v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060,1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 647.
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014).

71 United
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A third type of insider trading that has been adopted is Rule 14e-3, 72 after the
judicial determination of Chiarella v. United States.73 In Chiarella, the defendant escaped
SEC insider trading rules as the Court found that Chiarella derived no fiduciary duty from
anyone when inadvertently gained material nonpublic information regarding a tender offer. 74
Without being under the jurisdiction of Rule 10b-5, Chiarella had no obligation to abstain or
disclose prior to relying on the information. 75 To counteract the holding from Chiarella, the
SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 which prohibits any person with material nonpublic information
regarding a tender offer to disclose the information to the public or to trade in securities that
are connected with the tender offer. 76
To clarify, a tippee cannot be held liable for insider trading without the tipper
breaching their fiduciary duty and gaining a personal benefit from passing the material
nonpublic information. 7 This paper deals with the misappropriation theory, as security
breaches and the tippees who trade on that information are generally not an officer, director or
10% shareholder of the company. 78
Application of Current Insider Trading Laws
The SEC has stated in recent years that it would like to make insider trading actions
a high priority, to ensure integrity of the markets. 79 In 2013, the SEC brought 44 insider
trading enforcement actions and 52 actions in 2014. 80 Despite the clear intent of the SEC, the
current laws do not explicitly consider the new realm of technology and its position in the
world of insider trading. The SEC did have a positive breakthrough regarding insider trading
and cyberhacking in the Second Circuit, with the case of SEC v. Dorozhko,8 ' which is
discussed at length below.
Can we define the Internet security breaches and hackers as tippers? If not, there is
no fiduciary duty owed, thus allowing tippees who are passed material nonpublic information
from tippers to profit, as they are not restricted by a duty to the company to abstain or disclose
the information. 52 If yes, then how do these hacker tippers hold a fiduciary duty to the
company regarding their material nonpublic information and can the hackers be identified?
This is the issue that society is currently presented with. Those who possess material
nonpublic information without a fiduciary
duty to the company to abstain or disclose is free to
3
rely and trade on the information.8
72 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (2012).
73 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).

Id.
11Id. at 227.
76 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (2012).
7' Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647, 654 (1983).
78Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907,4 (Nov. 8,1961).
79 SEC Continues Aggressive Insider Trading Enforcement, WECOMPLY (May 15, 2014),
http://www.wecomply.com/post/2220481 -sec-continues-aggressive-insider-trading-enforcement.
80Year-by-Year SEC Enforcement Statistics, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/news/newsroon/images/enfstats.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1,2015).
s 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
82"Id. at45.
74

3 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
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Due to the narrow requirements of tippers, the security breaches are unable to satisfy
the requirements of a tipper. Though it is arguable that tippees of information obtained
through security breaches are identifiable, tippees can only be charged if the tipper breached a
fiduciary duty by disclosing information to the tippee and if the tippee knows or has a reason
to know of the breach. 84 Furthermore, tippees must have knowledge of a fiduciary duty,
which is breached with manipulation or deception, which is not possible as there is no
identifiable tipper who has a fiduciary duty. 85 Therefore, there is currently no duty for a
tippee to abstain
or disclose the nonpublic information simply by holding the said
86
information.

Though insider trading laws have been around for 80 years, dealing with the new
technologies aspect has been difficult. Challenges are furthered by the fact that there are
currently no cybersecurity laws that carry substantial weight and require the private sector to
update their security regularly.87 The private sector is only motivated to update their security
up to the extent for which their clients and investors push. With issues such as the recent
security breach bugs, cybersecurity needs to be regulated for preventative measures.
The glimmer of recognition of this issue is evident by the Second Circuit's ruling in
SEC v. Dorozhko in 2009.88 In this matter, the defendant hacked into the servers of Thomson
Financial, who provided investor relations and had a copy of the earnings report prior to
publication for publically traded company IMS Health, Inc. ("IMS"). 89 The defendant was
able to retrieve a copy of the earnings report and used his Interactive Brokers account for the
first time to purchase put options of IMS worth $41,670.90 around 3:00pm on the same day.
The defendant's purchase was one that the SEC analyzed to be extremely risky without the
knowledge of the earnings projections being over 25% higher than reality. 9 The defendant's
purchase accounted for 90% of the put options sold within the past six weeks.
Around 4:30pm, IMS reported the unexpected low earnings publically and saw their
stock price fall 28% before the market closed for the day. The following day, within the first
six minutes of the stock market opening, the defendant sold all of his IMS options, netting a
profit of $286,456.59.91 Interactive Brokers, who in turn reported the oddity to the SEC, noted
the abnormality of purchase and sale. 92
The SEC obtained a temporary restraining order to freeze the profit from the stock
option sell prior to its transfer to the defendant's account in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, after a preliminary
injunction hearing on the basis that the SEC failed to prove a likelihood of success. 93 The
District Court rationalized that computer hacking is not deceptive; since the hacker did not
95
94
have a relationship of confidence with the company, there was no fiduciary duty owed.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230, n. 12 (1980).
8 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
86 Chiarella,445 U.S. at 223.
87 FISCHER, supra note 15, at 1-2.
88 SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
" Id. at 44.
9 Id.
91 Id.

id.
93Id.
92

94 Id. at 47, see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
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The District Court additionally emphasized to the SEC that such a threat was predictable and
consciously chose to avoid addressing the issue, thus leading them down to the denial of this
injunction. 96
The SEC appealed to the Second Circuit by arguing that the defendant
laws. 97
misrepresented himself, which is deceptive fraud and therefore within insider trading
98
The Second Circuit distinguished this case from precedent, such as Chiarella, where silence
of a party was in question, as here there was an affirmative misrepresentation, which is "a
distinct species of fraud." 99 The Court found that the defendant was subject to insider trading
gain nonpublic material information is a form of fraud, but
charges since misrepresentation to
100
without finding a fiduciary duty.
Federal administrations for the past fifteen years have placed cybersecurity as an
important issue, though minimal improvements have been made. 101The federal cybersecurity
regulations, such as the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 ("FISMA"),
only apply to government agencies.1 02 Under FISMA, government agencies are required to
ensure that their systems are secure by conducting periodic assessments and testing,
procedures based on risk assessment, training for personnel, remedial actions to address any
103
deficiencies and methods to detect, report and respond to security incidents.
The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act of 2012 Bill ("2012 Cyber Act
The 2012 Cyber Act
Bill") passed through the House but failed to pass through the Senate. 104
Bill was intended to amend the National Security Act of 1947 and give the federal
government the right to information gathered by the private entities.105 Furthermore, the bill
stated that the federal government would use the cyber information gathered to confirm
adequate cybersecurity to safeguard the system, and ensure confidentiality, to investigate
cybersecurity crimes and to protect U.S. national homeland security. 0 6
President Obama has been trying to push a cybersecurity bill through Congress in
the past few years, but unfortunately with no avail. 107 As Congress has failed to assist the
President with his cybersecurity agenda, President Obama signed an Executive Order to
Improve Critical Infrastructure of Cybersecurity ("Executive Order") in February of 2013.10"
One of the main aims of the Executive Order was to establish specific cybersecurity
9'Dorozkho, 574 F.3d at 45.
96 SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 341-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
97Dorozkho, 574 F.3d at 45.
98 See generally Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.

99Dorozkho, 574 F.3d at 49.
'0o
Id. at 49-50.
101Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2014).
10244 U.S.C. § 3541 (2012).
113 Detailed Overview of FISMA, NIST - Computer Security Division, NIST.Gov (last updated on Apr. 1,
2014), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/overview.html.
104 Zeichner on PresidentialAction on Cybersecurity, 2013 Emerging Issues 6932, (Lexis).
"' H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3523.
106 id.
107Michael D. Shear, Obama to Announce CybersecurityPlans in State of the Union Preview, NYTIMES.COM
(Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/us/politics/obama-to-announce-cybersecurity-plans-instate-of-the-union-preview.html?_r=0.
108 Zeichner, supra note 104; Ronald D. Lee & Nicholas L. Townsend, Gov't Cybersecurity Standards Could
Impact Many Companies, LAW360 (Aug. 16, 2013).
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requirements and standards. 109 The Order further states how issues may be addressed and
increases the cyber resilience. 0 The cybersecurity Order additionally places emphasis on the
need for cybersecurity risk management and specialists to create a consistent security protocol
and increase the federal government's accountability for cybersecurity issues. "'
President Obama stated in the 2015 State of the Union that he hopes that
cybersecurity will come to the forefront of Congress' agenda, especially due to the recent
cybersecurity issues faced by American companies, such as Sony Entertainment Pictures,
Home Depot and Target, have faced. 112As detrimental issues, such as insider trading
transactions, can arise with weak cybersecurity, the federal government should impose
requirements to protect the US government and private companies from facing cybersecurity
breaches.
Why The Current Model No Longer Covers All Types of Insider Trading
The current insider trading laws and case precedents do not directly deal with online
security breaches and the release of private and confidential information, despite living in an
era where all companies and people store a vast of information online. These online databases
are generally accepted to be private and secure, and therefore only available to those who
have access and a fiduciary duty to the company. 113 Recent events are proving that these
secure databases are vulnerable to security breaches; therefore modified laws are warranted to
'
ensure that those who do wrong in this novel manner are charged. 14
Currently, companies have no obligation to report cyber intrusions to law
enforcement." 5 Furthermore, most companies do not want to publicize that they have been
compromised and attempt to deal with the problem internally. "' In March of 2014, SEC
Chairwoman Mary Jo White stated that public companies have an obligation to report
"material risks to their business - including risks related to data security like hacking and
identity theft." ' 1 7 Chairwoman White goes on to state that reporting this gives investors full

109 Zeichner, supra note 104.

"10EO

13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, GSA.Gov (last updated, Sept. 30, 2014),

http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/176547.
I" Id.
112 Shear, supra note 107.

Lauren C. Williams, The HeartbleedBug Reveals We're Willing To Give Up Online Security To Feel More
Connected, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 12, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2014/04/l1/3425310/what-theheartbleed-bug-says-about-our-interconnectivity.
114 Green, supra note 21; Sherwin, supra note 1; Bill Buchanan, Heartbleed bug: insider trading may have
taken place as shares slid ahead of breaking story, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://theconversation.com/heartbleed-bug-insider-trading-may-have-taken-place-as-shares-slid-ahead-of"3

breaking-story-26026.
"5 Zoe Argento, Killing The Golden Goose: The Dangersof Strengthening Domestic Trader Secret Rights in
Response to Cyber Misappropriation,16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 172, 216 (2013-14).
116 Id.
117 Jordan Thomas & Vanessa De Simone, Cybersecurity- Growing Technological Threats Raise New Issues
ADVOCATE
(May
1, 2014),
for Investors and the
SEC, SEC
WHISTLE BLOWER
athe
lebloweradvoate/ybersecurity-grwing-technologicalhttp://www.sewhisteborave.cors
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disclosure on the company, as well as motivates companies to continuously update their
cybersecurity. 118 Despite the SEC's recent comments, the private sector still fails to disclose
security breaches in fear of losing investors and clients. " 9
Due to the case precedent holding that tippees are only liable for insider trading if a
fiduciary duty is derived from the tipper's duty, we need to both close the gap of
cybersecurity, and insider trading loopholes. Should society fail to amend and strengthen the
laws, wrongdoers are going to trade on material nonpublic information with the intent to
deceive.
Il. CURRENT LAWS AND HOW THEY ARE BEING CIRCUMVENTED
Lack of Legislation Requiring Cybersecurity Standards
Currently, there are minimal cybersecurity requirements in the United States and
therefore no attention is given in this Note regarding how wrongdoers are circumventing
cyber laws.' 20 An example of how vulnerable the United States has made itself by the lack of
cybersecurity requirements is demonstrated through the November 2014 Sony Pictures
Entertainment ("Sony Pictures") hack. 121Sony Pictures employees saw a message on their
the Guardian of
computers stating that the company has been hacked by a group known as
22
Peace ("GOP") and that a copious amount of data had been compromised. 1
In December 2014 after a thorough investigation, the Federal Bureau of
123
Investigations determined that the North Korean government executed this cyberattack.
Despite this being an international cybercrime, there is no reason that hackers within the
United States could not have accomplished a hack of such magnitude. Furthermore, there is
no certainty that any cybersecurity requirements applicable to companies, such as Sony
Pictures, could have protected the company against such an invasive cybercrime. This public
and very recent cyberattack demonstrates just how susceptible our society is to such threats.
The Sony Pictures stock price was not greatly affected by the hack, as the hackers
released some of the documents to the public and kept the rest private. 124 The stock price was
further kept stable due to the actions of the recently hired Chief Financial Officer. 125
Additionally, society believes that the company can bounce back from the hack since such
2014),

26,
(Mar.
SEC
Cybersecurity,
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublieStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541286468#.VE6D675WOsq.
jig Thomas & De Simone, supranote 117; Mary Jo White, supra note 117.

"9 Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Hacked companies still not telling investors, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/us-hacking-disclosures-idUSTRE81 10YW20120202.
120 See generallyFISCHER, supra note 15.

121 Dave

Lewis,
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Pictures

Hacked

And

Blackmailed,

FORBES

(Nov.

24,

2014),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/davelewis/2014/11/24/sony-pictures-hacked-and-blackmailed.
122 id.

123 Update on Sony Investigation, FBI.Gov (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrelpressreleases/update-on-sony-investigation.
124 James Cook, Sony Hackers Have Over 100 Terabytes Of Documents. Only Released 200 Gigabytes So Far,
BUsINESSINSIDER (Dec. 16, 2014) http://www.businessinsider.com/the-sony-hackers-still-have-a-massiveamount-of-data-that-hasnt-been-leaked-yet-2014-12.
125 Ansuya Harjani, Forget hacking drama, Sony stock to rise 40%: analyst, CNBC (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102290728.
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bumps are factored in the movie industry to account for unsuccessful movies and other
potential hindrances. 26 Regardless of the stock aspect of the hack, Sony Pictures faced what
is turning out to "possibly [be] the costliest [hack] ever for an American company.' ' 127 It is
estimated that this breach could cost Sony Pictures over $100 million. 28
The hackers have released a vast amount of private information, from unreleased
movies to information regarding employees (salary, social security numbers, addresses, etc.)
to private email exchanges of the executives. 129
The GOP hackers have stated that they only
released about 235 gigabytes of the 100 terabytes of material they have taken from the Sony
Pictures databases. 130 Further, this breach has resulted in current and former employees suing
Sony Pictures for security breach, stating that the company failed to adequately ensure that all
private employee information was protected. 131The suit alleges that Sony Pictures
was
32
negligent in failing to prepare for a cyberthreat despite the numerous past hacks. 1
Past and present employees of Sony Pictures have faced an injustice and are dealing
with it through the class action suits, but what if this were an insider trading issue? The
market currently does not have a remedy if hackers, such as the Sony Pictures hackers, passed
the stolen information onto others who traded based on the information. Are these the type of
individuals that we are attempting to protect with the rigidity of the current insider trading
requirements?
The Dorozkho case holding can only support for a hacker tipper's reliance on stolen
material nonpublic information to trade. Dorozkho did not entertain what would happen if the
tipper were to pass the information on to a tippee who relied on it, as the Dorozkho court was
able to convict without a fiduciary duty. What about if the GOP hackers passed material
nonpublic information onto a select few people who did then rely on the information and
trade? There is no value in protecting these wrongdoers and allowing them to profit off
companies and devalue the intentions of security investments.
Society has now been looking at the government and its agencies to deal with the
disaster that resulted from the November 2014 Sony Pictures hack. The SEC is attempting to
notify those within its reach about the threat of cybersecurity and its impact on stocks. 33
'
Chairwoman Mary Jo White states that protecting online investments from cyberthreats is a
main focus of the SEC. Chairwoman White also holds that by government agencies working
together, the threat of cyberattacks can be minimized. '14

126

Jack

Hough, Sony Stock Is a Bargain Despite Hack Attack, BARRONS (Dec.

17, 2014),

http://online.barrons.com/articles/sony-stock-is-a-bargain-despite-hack-attack-1418916503.
127 Hariani, supra note 125.
128 Lisa Richwine, Cyber attack could cost Sony studio as much as $100 million, REUTERS.COM (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/09/us-sony-cybersecurity-costs-idUSKBNOJN2L20141209.
129 Cook, supra note 124; Steve Musil, Unreleased Sony movies leaked to file-sharing sites after hack, CNET
(Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/hackers-leak-new-sony-movies-to-file-sharing-sites.
130 Cook, supra note 124.
131 Seth Rosenblatt
Sony sued by former employees over hack, CNET.COM (Dec.

16, 2014),

http://www.cnet.com/news/sony-sued-by-current-former-employees-over-hack.
132Ralph Ellis, Lawsuits say Sony Picturesshould have expected security breach, CNN.cOM (Dec. 20, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/20/us/sony-pictures-lawsuits.
133 Press Release Washington, DC, SEC Alerts Investors Industry on Cybersecurity, SEC. Gov (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-20.html#.VNaw5kJW2SE.
134 Id.
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As discussed, there is an enormous and unacceptable gap in modem society's
necessary legislation regarding cybersecurity. On the other hand, there are insider trading
laws which we can turn to and assess how they are being eluded through cyberhacking.
How Insider Trading's Laws Are Currently Being Evaded
In the Dirks v. SEC case, the Supreme Court stated that proof that material
nonpublic information was disclosed in breach of the tipper's duty of confidentiality and for
personal benefit is required to show a breach of fiduciary duty. 35 The personal benefit
requirement that is necessary to establish a breach of fiduciary duty has been applied quite
liberally. Furthering a friendship' 36 and other profit types beyond monetary' 37 are examples of
what has been considered a personal benefit. Furthermore, the Dirks Court broadmindedly
that the tippee merely should know
stated that the tippee is liable when it can be established
38
that the tipper has breached their fiduciary duty. 1
The lenient language of the seminal Dirks case has allowed the SEC to hold many
people accountable for their unlawful actions. The Second Circuit in December 2014 has
greatly added to the burden of showing insider trading with the holding of United States v.
Newman. 139 The Second Circuit held that a tippee is only liable for insider trading when they
when the tipper breached their
had knowledge that the tipper gained a personal benefit and
40
fiduciary duty and thus passed that breach onto the tippee. 1
In the Newman case, the two defendants tippees were portfolio managers at hedge
fund companies. 4 ' The government argued that the corporate insiders passed that material
nonpublic information to analysts at hedge fund companies, and these analysts passed it onto
the defendants, directly and indirectly. The government provided evidence that the defendants
traded on the said material nonpublic information and collectively earned nearly $70 million

in profits. 142
Due to the rigidity that resulted from the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Dirks
test, the Newman Court found that there was insufficient evidence in the matter to prove that
the tippees (defendants) had actual knowledge that the tipper gained a personal benefit. Due
to the government's failure to meet its burden to show that illegal insider trading occurred, the
matter was dismissed with prejudice. '"3
Even after considering the 2014 Newman case'" and the 2009 Dorozkho case 145, the
SEC still treads in murky water when it comes to charging cyberhackers with insider trading,
let alone the ability to charge the tippees that can result from the hackers actions. Dorozkho
was found to be within the jurisdiction of insider trading as the SEC successfully argued that
13'

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983).

136See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 2012).
137William McLucas et al., Recent Insider Trading Decision, MONDAQ (Dec. 29, 2014).
138Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (1983) (emphasis added).

United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 450.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 443.
143 Id. at 455.
1

140

I" Id.
14 SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Dorozkho's misrepresentation during the hacking process was deceptive fraud, enough to be
within the insider trading rules despite the lack of a fiduciary duty. 146 The Second Circuit
agreed with the SEC but remanded the issue of whether misrepresentation is deceptive
theft. 4 7 Despite the SEC successfully arguing that misrepresentation is deceptive fraud matter
based on the specific facts of this case, the precedent established is not convincing enough or
fully encompassing of all future cyberhacking cases. Furthermore, the Dorozkho holding
applies to those who hack and then trade based on the information, but what happens when
the hacker pass on the information? How can a tippee be held liable without the fiduciary
duty being passed along with the material nonpublic information?
From the holding of the recent judgment of the Newman case, tippees resulting from
information gained via a cyberhacker will likely not be aware of a personal benefit gained by
the hacker tipper. The 'tippee knowledge of tipper personal benefit' requirement seems quite
rigid and unnecessary as it protects many who should not be afforded that comfort. Both the
traditional tipper and hacker (non-traditional) tipper can pass information onto another (a
tippee) without gaining a personal benefit, let alone the tippee's knowledge of the personal
benefit. Are we content with a tippee trading based on the material nonpublic information if
the tippee does not gain actual knowledge of the tipper's benefit?
Based on this rationale from Dorozkho 48 and Newman 49 , even if the SEC is able to
get the hacker for fraudulent acts, the tippees who are affecting the validity of the market
would have the freedom to trade. These types of actions are clearly against the public policy
and intention of insider trading laws, but when looked at closer, fail to meet all the
requirements for insider trading.
The Hacker's Loophole Becomes Apparent with Recent Events
Coupling the recent Sony Pictures hack and the online security breach bugs into
context; along with the insider trading laws movement in the Second Circuit, through the
Dorozkho "' and Newman 151 cases, there is a vast problem that needs to be addressed
immediately. Cyber laws need to be intertwined with securities laws to further strengthen
insider trading regulations. Without adequate cyber laws the securities laws may be left with a
weakness.
Why are we holding personalbenefit to be a determinative factor for insider trading
Why
are we leaving a realm of unknown application regarding insider trading
actions?
transactions via hackers and the resulting tippees? Should online hackers who steal material
nonpublic information about companies and those who the information is passed on (potential
tippees), be allowed to trade and gain based on the information? Are these not the exact type
of intentional misconduct that security laws are supposed to prevent?
There is an apparent means of evasion between the intentions of insider trading laws
and how they are being applied, especially in light of information obtained through

146 Id.

at 49-51.

141Id. at 51.

Dorozhko, 574 F.3d.
773 F.3d.
"50Dorozhko, 574 F.3d
148

141 Newman,

' Newman, 773 F.3d.
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cyberspace. Laws are ever-changing and are to solve difficulties that come to light, thus we
must apply them as society develops for the better but opens to greater flaws. Now that
society can clearly identify that there is a problem with cybersecurity and its connection to
insider trading, it is time for the weakness to be eliminated and the wrongdoers accountable
for their objectionable actions.
IV. HOW NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE LAW WILL COMBAT THIS NEW
TYPE OF INSIDER TRADING
Time for a Change
First, changes are evidently needed to close the large gap between the interpretation
of insider trading rules and the new realm of cyberhacking. Cybersecurity is a problem that
society has been forced to look at in the past year, after years of avoidance. "2 Society saw
some of the largest and most destructive cyberhacks in 2014. From the recent events it has
become clear that changes should have been made to account for cyberhacking possibilities
prior to the vulnerability being violated. Despite the fact that we cannot change the past, we
can ensure that our future is guarded from such avoidable acts. We now have the opportunity
to make amendments to our current laws to account for the exposed and future prospective
weaknesses.
The stock market holds great value in the economy and has the ability to change the
course of business within a few days as evidenced by the recent 2008 Stock Market Crash,
and also the infamous 1929 Wall Street Stock Market Crash. Due to the recent cyberhacks, it
has evidently been revealed that there is vulnerability, and therefore it should be resolved
before the vulnerability is compromised and society faces an event comparable to that of the
2008 stock market crash, or even one as great as the 1929 crash. As the SEC was created with
the intention of protecting society from instable markets, the SEC has a burden of remediating
this issue, as does Congress. The integrity of the stock market can be easily undermined, as
long as this existing weakness remains.
Both the international element and lack of cybersecurity standards add
complications for the ability to eliminate cyberhacking. Therefore, until we can curb
cyberhacking as a whole, we must ensure that we prosecute any insider trading that may
result. There are various ways in which we can address and remediate the issues regarding
hacker tippers and tippees who may rely on information obtained through the hacking.
Adding a Cyberhacking Caveat to Rule 10b-5
One approach would be to amend the SEC rules to forbid insider trading with
reliance on material nonpublic information taken via hacking, and the tippees who may result.
The SEC has the jurisdiction to charge on matters dealing with the purchase of a security
through manipulative or deceptive device. '53 Hacking is an intentional act and requires
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manipulation, 154 therefore the SEC has jurisdiction to charge for insider trading that results
from hackers gaining information. 55
Tippers and tippees who result from insider trading via hacking can be accounted
for by adding a subsection under Rule 1Ob-5. Though it could be argued that Dorozkho has
provided a degree of precedence for hackers, it is not clearly effective, nor does it account for
tippees who may follow. Additionally, the holding from Dorozkho is further weakened by the
Newman holding, requiring the tippee to have knowledge of the personal benefit that the
tipper is gaining from passing the material nonpublic information. Therefore despite the
breakthrough that the SEC had with the Dorozkho holding, it shows no promise that all
hackers will fall within the same fact pattern, let alone the hacker's tippees. As the Dorozkho
case, especially with the Newman holding, failed in successfully setting a strong precedent for
encompassing hackers within the SEC insider trading regulations, there is clear evidence
showing a need for a specific rule to make such activity illegal.
Tippees should be liable for insider trading via hacking even without knowing the
tipper's personal benefit156 or even a finding of fiduciary duty.157The current determinative
factors for finding insider trading do not encompass the intent of the laws. The intent of
insider trading laws should be revisited to determine the best method on how to amend the
law to encompass the fluidity of society. As the SEC has stated, the intent of insider trading
laws are to ensure the veracity of the markets, separating the tipper and tippee in such
situations will ensure that tippees do not evade insider trading rules by this current method to
circumvent the laws.

Tippee Liability Absent Identified Tipper
As argued above in favor of the Rule lOb-5 caveat for hackers, there are also some
potential issues. Due to the international and extreme anonymity of cyberhackers, there may
be a very minimal likelihood of being able to identify the hackers,1 58 let alone assert sufficient
personal jurisdiction over them to bring them into US courts. "9Noting the personal
jurisdiction issue, it should also be revealed that personal jurisdiction has been asserted over
an international defendant through the federal long-arm statute of Federal Rule of Civil
154 See n.

22.
But see Robert T. Denny, Beyond Mere Theft: Why Computer Hackers Trading on Wrongfully Acquired
Information Should Be Held Accountable Under the Securities Exchange Act, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 963, 980
155

(2010) (Mr. Denny argues that backing should only be applied in instances where the hacker "guess[es] a
password [], exploit[s] a computer code, or otherwise deceive a computer ] contrary to its intended usage. Id.
156 US v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2014).
117Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 678-79 (1983).
"' Andres A. Mufioz, United States v. Jarrett(DecidedJuly 29, 2003), 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 411, 419 (2005).
...Havlish v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2014 WL 4828654, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014). This case holds
that the petitioners hold the burden of proving that there is sufficient personal jurisdiction of the court over the
defendant. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(2) (2012). To ease the petitioner, the court finds that the petitioner's
assertions are deemed to be true unless invalidated by the defendant. Havlish, WL 4828654, at *2.
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Procedure 4(k)(2), 160 when the necessary minimal contacts to the state has been
established. 161
In the matter of MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 162 the Second Circuit found that the
Court had personal jurisdiction over a Canadian defendant who hacked into the computers
located in Connecticut, of a company also based in Connecticut.' 63 The Court stated that the
minimal contacts were satisfied as the defendant hacked into servers, which were located in
Connecticut; therefore that defendant's act brought her within the federal long-arm statute and
state. 164
that of the state, as the statute only requires that the device [computer] be within the
Further, in this matter, the minimal contacts were sufficient as the defendant65 was aware of the
fact that the servers that she was hacking into were located in Connecticut.'
Despite the holding established by MacDermid, Inc., establishing personal
66
jurisdiction over a hacker can only be found once the hacker has been identified.1 Again,
due to the high anonymity of hacking, that may be exceedingly unlikely.'67 As the current
SEC rules state that a tipper must be identified prior to the ability of charging a tippee,
holding the hackers as tippers may not always allow for liability to be asserted on tippees who
may result. Given the uncertainty of constantly identifying hackers and thus tippers in insider
trading actions that result from cyberhacking, removing the barrier of identifying the tipper
when attempting to assert an insider trading charge against obvious tippees would further
ensure that insider trading rules are upheld to their broadest application.
Cyberhacking Prevention Burden on Companies
A third option which can help confirm that tippees will be held accountable,
regardless of whether this is an identifiable tipper or not, is to place more of a burden on the
companies. This option accounts for both the insider trading vulnerability and the lack of
cybersecurity regulations. Currently, with the lack of cybersecurity requirements and the rigid
definition for insiders, companies are not held to a high standard of responsibility. Holding
the companies as the tippers can strengthen the current low standard. Insider trading resulting
from cyberhacking can bypass its current loophole by injecting the company in place of the
tipper. If the burden of allowing hacking and thus the transmission of material nonpublic
information are placed on the company, the tippees can be held liable for their actions.
Under such a regulation, the hackers would be the tippees of the company as the
company clearly has a fiduciary duty to itself to keep material nonpublic information
confidential. The hacker tippees are then passed information from the company tipper through
deliberate means or reckless disregard to protect its confidential information. The company
can be said to gain a material benefit of falsely inflated stock prices, which can be an
unintended result of insider trading. Further, those who the hacker tippee passes the
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 4(k)(2). (2012).
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S.
310 (1945).
162 702 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2012).
163 id.
164 Id. at 728-29.
165 Id. at 730.
166 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983).
167 Mufioz, supra note 158.
160
161
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information onto would become remote tippees and carry the fiduciary duty that the hacker
obtained from the company as the original tipper.
Security breaches, the Internet as a host, and insider trading are issues that have
been around for a while, though they have been ill prepared for. If such security breaches and
insider trading were more apparent, public companies would have been spending more and
doing whatever else necessary to ensure that their private and confidential information remain
that way until they desire to release it. In comparison, if companies could have foreseen these
breaches, they could have taken the information offline and stored it in a different manner.
Given that companies are evidently not adhering to the caliber needed to keep
hackers barred, the law should both hold them accountable for their ineffectiveness while
raising the norm by implementing cybersecurity standards. Holding companies as tippers in
such instances, where tippees are relying on material nonpublic information obtained through
cyberhacking will force companies to ensure that their information is secure. The
implementation of this change would require security experts and companies to ensure that
they have the best security, maintenance and ability to update for potential threats ahead of
hackers. On the other hand, it will also protect companies by having the means to reach
tippees, though also facing the issue of the tipper (itself) breaching its fiduciary duty. Though
again, the intent of insider trading laws is to maintain the integrity of the market and therefore
it is necessary that the tippees be reached and charged rightfully.
Society's call for cybersecurity standards is necessary and though the risks of
cyberhacking were visible prior to the many recent incidents, 2014 saw a glimpse of the true
extent of such acts. The struggles from the past years must drive this issue to the forefront of
Congress' and the SEC's attention. There are a great deal of benefits of the exponential
technology growth in recent times, though we cannot forget to be mindful of the potential
issues that come along with that progression.
Federal Laws
The call for mandated changes to the insider trading laws and its relation to
cybersecurity laws must be uniform across the country to ensure its greatest strength of
enforcement. State borders are becoming less apparent in all respects, though noticeably and
understandably in cyberspace. If each state or court jurisdiction were to have its own laws and
applications for cyberhacking insider trading issues, or even cybersecurity as a whole, we will
undoubtedly be faced with numerous issues by repairing this one issue. Insider trading laws
and other security regulations
are already applied differently by each circuit court, a problem
68
that we need not add to. 1

If the insider trading laws in respect to cyberhacking are not consistent across the
nation, then we will likely see illegal insider trading via hacking within the jurisdictions that
fail to apply the laws with vigor, or tolerate loopholes for tippees to evade insider trading
rules with. Furthermore, we will possibly see a higher number of actions within the strict
jurisdictions by the SEC bringing suits within those jurisdictions when possible. Looking
back at the original intent, having varying definitions and applications would weaken the
reputation of the stock markets, a result that we are attempting to avoid.
168 Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enterprise Element of Investment
ContractAnalysis, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 2135, 2158 (1995).
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CIRCUMVENTING INSIDER TRADING LAWS BY CYBERHACKING
In regard to cybersecurity, this is a national issue at the very least, not merely a
jurisdictional issue. The lack of cybersecurity regulations, especially in regards to security
regulations and specifically insider trading, is a positive, in the sense that it allows us to start
from a clean slate. We have now been in the cyber world for a long duration, which allows
expert to explore and understand the intricate cyber issues that can arise. Congress should
take this opportunity to pass legislation to encompass the diverse aspects in which cyberspace
exists in our lives. There are relatively no borders in cyberspace, and therefore there should be
none within a nation for the laws that apply to cyberspace.
CONCLUSION
Sony Pictures hack and the Internet security bugs have proven that hackers are
infiltrating every aspect of our society, from entertainment to financial platforms. Society has
become more and more dependent on the Internet and the information we choose to transmit
online. As cyber space continues to become more ingrained in our everyday lives, we must
protect this new space; otherwise we will continue to see the wrath of what hackers are
capable of.
The SEC is currently posed with a new type of insider trading. If hackers are able to
infiltrate the servers of public companies to gain material nonpublic information, they are also
able to pass that information onto tippees. Hackers do not have a confidential relationship
with the company whom they are taking information from without permission; therefore
hackers have no fiduciary duty to the company. 169 Tippees who obtain material nonpublic
information from hacker tippers are then able to rely and trade on the material nonpublic
information without a fiduciary duty to the company being placed on them.
Insider trading transactions resulting from security breaches and hackers pose a very
genuine concern that may affect the markets unknowingly. Security breaches can be difficult
to notice and can easily be anonymous. 7 0 The anonymity of potential hacker tippers creates
an issue for the SEC's ability to charge tippees, as the tippee has no insider trading liability
without the proof of the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty.
Given the strength that the stock markets have proven to possess in the United
States, we must ensure the integrity of the market by closing all gaps. Insider trading laws
must be amended to account for hackers and their potential tippees by creating a caveat for
hackers being tippers within the SEC regulations regarding insider trading. The laws can
additionally be altered to remove the requirement of identifying tippers prior to charging
tippees with insider trading. Furthermore, insider trading regulations can also be amended to
encompass hackers by holding the companies as tippers, the hackers as tippees, and those
whom obtain information from the hacker and rely on the information as remote tippees. This
third option will also ensure that public companies have strong cybersecurity measures, as the
current lack of cybersecurity regulations is an added component in the issue of insider trading
via hackers.

v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42,48 (2d Cir. 2009).
Mufioz, supra note 158.
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